




#### **BENEFICIAL OWNERSHIP & CONTROL** STRINGENT VERSUS FLEXIBLE RULES

#### Erik P.M. Vermeulen

#### 30 March 2012 Moscow, Russia









# Comparative Study









#### Disclosure is the Linchpin of Corporate Governance






and to whom?


# The Rules






Indonesia Policy Dialogue, Disclosure of Beneficial Ownership and Control, October 2011.


### **Costs of Disclosure & Reporting**




## The Effect of Disclosure & Outside Blockholders




Source: Brav, Jiang, Thomas and Partnoy, Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance






Enforcement









## **Information Ecosystem**

Foreign Supervisory Authorities/Securities Commissions/Government Agencies

Supervisory Agency/ Securities Commission

Government Agencies (tax authorities, chambers of commerce, etc.)

Central Securities Depository, custodians, intermediaries IOSCO, BUT INFORMATION SHARING ALSO IN NATIONAL LAWS/REGULATIONS

Foreign Supervisory Authorities/Securities Commissions/Government Agencies

WEB-BASED SYSTEM, INFORMATION SHARING


Supervisory Agency/ Securities Commission BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT

INFORMATION REQUESTS (CONFIDENTIAL)

Government Agencies (tax authorities, chambers of commerce, etc.)

Central Securities Depository, custodians, intermediaries

# **Project Wickenby**



Source: www.ato.gov.au

## Conclusions Non-Judicial Enforcement Dialogue between **Regulators and Industry** Mix of Enforcement Flexibility Control (& Ultimate Ownership) Information Sharing





# Thank you! e.p.m.vermeulen@uvt.nl



